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ITS:  WHAT WE KNOW NOW THAT WE WISH WE KNEW THEN: 
A RETROSPECTIVE ON THE ITS 1992 STRATEGIC PLAN 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
From September 1991 until June 1992, a core writing team, which included the author, worked 
on what was the first Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) strategic plan in the United States.  
This plan was entitled, “A Strategic Plan for IVHS in the United States”.  It served to define the 
ITS program at a national scale in a way that has been characterized as seminal. 
The plan, by most accounts, served as the blueprint for the early development of ITS in 
the U.S. and as the basis for the subsequent plans produced by ITS America, the federal 
government, various states, and a number of private-sector organizations.   
This paper explores numerous aspects of ITS retrospectively, contrasting views from 11 
years ago, when the Strategic Plan was produced, with the current reality.  Areas discussed 
include Advanced Traveler Information Systems (ATIS), Advanced Transportation Management 
Systems (ATMS), reliability, getting the ITS program off the ground in the early 90s, strategic 
use of information, automated network management, electronic toll collection (ETC), congestion 
pricing, architecture, commercial vehicle operations (CVO), Advanced Public Transportation 
Systems (APTS), and regions.   
The paper closes by comparing ITS with the Interstate, and finally by discussing the 
upcoming reauthorization of the Transportation Efficiency Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) 
and what has been learned through this retrospective about ITS-related issues on that 
reauthorization.   
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ITS:  WHAT WE KNOW NOW THAT WE WISH WE KNEW THEN: 
A RETROSPECTIVE ON THE ITS 1992 STRATEGIC PLAN 
 
 
PREFACE 
From September 1991 until June 1992, the author had the unique privilege of serving on the core 
writing team for the ITS America (then IVHS America) Strategic Plan, entitled “A Strategic Plan 
for IVHS in the United States”.(1)  The author’s sabbatical year from MIT provided an 
opportunity to be at the very center of the development of the first Intelligent Transportation 
Systems (ITS) strategic plan in the U.S.  It was a once-in-a-career opportunity to be in at a 
seminal moment of an emerging technology of substantial interest in the author’s field of study.  
The writing team, composed of Michael Sheldrick, Jonathan Arlook, Edward Greene, Craig 
Roberts and the author, was charged with writing a good deal of the plan as well as coordinating 
inputs from a variety of committees and groups around the United States, from both the public 
and private sectors.  The plan was subject to intense senior review (Thomas Deen, James 
Costantino, Lyle Saxton and William Spreitzer), and ultimately was approved by the 
Coordinating Council and the Board of Directors of ITS America.   
 The plan, by most accounts, served as the blueprint for the early development of ITS in 
the U.S. and as the basis for the subsequent plans produced by ITS America, the federal 
government, various states, and a number of private-sector organizations.   
Having said all this, it is clear that there was much the writing team and the ITS 
community more broadly defined did not understand about ITS and what would ultimately be the 
factors driving its success or lack thereof.  Looking back on that 1991/92 effort, while there was 
much that was right, there was a good deal wrong as well.  Some of these omissions were subtle; 
others were of the form “How could we (the nascent ITS community) not have thought of that?”   
Of course, some of these omissions derive from the changes that have taken place in the 
world over the last 11 years that were to some extent unforeseeable in 1992.  For example, while 
the Internet was beginning to have an impact, few foresaw the extraordinary change in 
workstyles and lifestyles inherent in that as an information/communication mechanism.  The 
evolution of the environmental movement to one concerned more broadly with sustainability, 
including economic development, environmental impact, social capital, and so forth, was not yet 
understood.  We knew that globalization was of fundamental importance, but the continued 
substantial growth of the global economy, fueled in large part by innovations in transportation 
systems, information systems and communication systems, was only partially seen.  The focus 
on security in the post-9/11 era, did not exist.  Demographers were pointing to the importance of 
the aging society back then.  It is more recently that the professional community has really 
understood the implications of the aging of the baby boomers and their desire to retain lifestyle 
and mobility at previously experienced levels.  And, the notion of developing-country megacities 
-- cities in excess of 10 million -- was looming on the horizon, where now in 2003, it is 
established as one of the critical contemporary issues the world faces, from economic 
development, environmental, and equity points of view.  Transportation is a key aspect of 
dealing with all these issues.   
So the world has changed substantially in these 11 years and now, with the benefit of 
20/20 hindsight, we can look back at what was not fully understood about ITS and its 
implications, and what, it is hoped, is better understood now.   
The author often uses the term “the planners” or “we”, connoting the “ITS community”.  
These are actually points that the author personally did not grasp in the early days of ITS.  While 
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the author  was likely not alone in this lack of understanding, certainly some did understand back 
then.  So, the reader should consider the points that follow as ideas the author “didn’t get right” 
and not as finding fault with the ITS community, other members of the writing team, or senior 
reviewers.   
 
ITS IN 2003:  HOW IT COMPARES WITH THE 1992 STRATEGIC PLAN 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
Advanced Traveler Information Systems (ATIS) 
One of the subsystems of ITS that we thought we had a good understanding of was Advanced 
Traveler Information Systems (ATIS).  We saw this as straightforward, with information being 
provided to drivers and transit users so they could make good decisions about how to access and 
utilize the transportation network.   
What we did not foresee was the explosion in the methods for delivering traveler 
information to these drivers and transit users.  The idea of the Internet as a source for traveler 
information had not occurred to us -- indeed, as Harold Worrall of Orlando-Orange County 
Expressway Authority has pointed out, the word “Internet” does not even appear in the 1992 
Strategic Plan.  The notion of ubiquitous use of cellular phones as a mechanism for receiving 
real-time traveler information during a trip was not fully appreciated.  Indeed, these cell phones 
are now a mechanism whereby vehicles can be located and tagged on the infrastructure so travel 
times on segments of networks can be measured.  This gives us a much better sense of the 
network state in the future, so important to giving good traveler information.   
 
Advanced Transportation Management Systems (ATMS) 
Advanced Transportation Management Systems (ATMS) is the companion subsystem to ATIS.  
While ATIS is directed to individual customers, ATMS is the subsystem through which we 
control or manage the transportation network for the benefit of the general public.   
Our early view of ATIS and ATMS were as countervailing.  ATIS was directed towards 
“relatively affluent” travelers who could afford to pay for special traveler information; ATMS 
was directed towards creating a better-operating transportation network for all drivers.  The 
techniques that would be used would include ramp-metering rates, dynamic variable message 
signs, incident detection and management, variable speed limits, and traffic light setting.   
However, it now appears that perhaps the best mechanism that we have to improve 
overall transportation network performance is by providing better traveler information, even if it 
is to a relatively small percentage of overall drivers.  The other network methods mentioned 
above -- ramp-metering rates, etc. -- may have a positive impact on network operations, but the 
sense is that properly informed drivers, knowledgeable now about where real-time chokepoints 
in the network may be, and acting in their own self-interest to avoid them, may have the most 
substantial impact on network operations improved for everybody than any of the techniques 
described above.   
So the notion of ATMS and ATIS as antithetic is wrong.  They will likely rise and fall 
together rather than there being a trade-off between effective ATMS and ATIS.  And since 
ATMS are usually public-sector operated and ATIS private-sector operated, this realization 
would seem to be quite important for developing public-private partnerships.   
 
ATIS as a For-Profit Venture 
The Strategic Plan envisioned private-sector organizations providing traveler information to 
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individual users as a profit-making activity, absolutely necessary in the private sector.  But at 
this writing, it is clear that making a profit in this business is very hard.  As Jane Lappin of the 
Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (VNTSC) has said, “There is no market for 
traveler information.”(2)  Free competition from radio stations makes it a very difficult sell; 
apparently the improvement in information that one gets from more sophisticated ATIS with a 
wider variety of data sources and a more real-time and route-specific nature is not something that 
many people are willing to pay for, at least not yet.   
So while organizations are making money in ITS, it is mainly through the provision of 
ITS infrastructure to the public sector rather than through the sale of better traveler information 
to the public in general.   
 
Reliability 
In the 1992 strategic planning exercise, we emphasized the benefits in improved travel times to 
drivers as a key economic benefit of ITS.  Time is money, we said.  Getting there faster has 
economic value.  While this is true, we overlooked, until quite recently, the importance of 
reliability to the highway traveler.  Reliability is a measure of the variability in travel time 
between two points.  We are all familiar with the fact that on Monday we have a quick half-hour 
trip from origin to destination, but on Tuesday an accident or storm or construction may cause 
that same trip to take twice that time.  If one is risk-averse about being late, one must build 
additional time above the “quick” travel time into one’s time budget.  Often it is wasted time in 
the sense that one arrives at the destination earlier than one intended.  But it is a price one may 
be willing to pay to avoid, for example, lateness for an important meeting (or even a class!).   
In many cases, improved reliability available through real-time information about today’s 
trip time is proving to be more important than improvements in average travel time.  This has 
been a phenomenon that has been well understood for decades in freight transportation.(3)  The 
trucking industry has won considerable traffic from the rail industry, even charging premium 
rates, because they provide more reliable trip times.  This is because unreliability generates 
additional inventory costs for the customer.  However, the understanding of the importance of 
reliability for highway travelers, where time management is critical, is relatively recent.(4)   
Indeed, it turns out that actual highway travel time savings are often ephemeral or rather 
small.  There is little empirical evidence to show that the small improvements in average travel 
time are economically meaningful.  When people get more reliable trips by receiving 
information about expected travel time and real time before the fact of the trip, some suggest 
they end up unconsciously converting that into (often non-existent) travel time savings in their 
minds.  What they have actually accomplished has been better time management when they 
receive real-time information about a trip that is about to be on the right-hand tail of the travel 
time distribution (or even the left-hand tail!).   
 
Getting the ITS Program off the Ground 
In the 1991/92 strategic planning era, there was a lot of discussion of “Alphonse and Gaston”.  
The planners were concerned that the private sector would not make R&D investments in in-
vehicle equipment until they were certain that the public sector would roll out public ITS 
infrastructure.  Conversely, there was concern that the public sector would not do that roll-out 
unless the private sector had a commitment to in-vehicle equipment.   
It turned out this concern was ill-founded.  In the U.S., with a very strong Federal 
Highway Administration (FHWA) in the lead and holding most of the cards (and dollars), the 
public sector clearly took the initiative in rolling out ITS; the private sector, especially the 
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automobile manufacturers in the United States, was more lethargic in developing in-vehicle 
equipment, and probably lags to this very day behind Japanese and European carmakers.   
It is interesting that this same pattern of roll-out did not occur in Japan.  There, rather 
than an omnipotent Federal Highway Administration, there was a war of the ministries -- 
including the Ministry of Transportation, the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications, the 
National Police Agency, and so forth -- about dominance in their nascent ITS movement.  
Eventually, the private-sector automobile manufacturers tired of this bureaucratic armwrestling 
and rolled out their autonomous in-vehicle systems, without waiting for a public-sector 
commitment to ITS.  This demonstrates how institutional form can create differences in the way 
technologies are developed, as documented by Hans Klein in his MIT doctoral thesis.(5)   
 
Strategic Use of Information 
In 1991/92, the emphasis in the “IVHS” Strategic Plan was the collection of data about traffic 
conditions in real-time that could lead to more efficient network flows and improving, through 
traveler information, trips for individual travelers.  Of course, this has happened.  But what was 
largely overlooked was the strategic use of this same information for transportation planning 
purposes.  
As the author has noted in a previous paper(6), prior to ITS, data for strategic network 
planning -- the adding of infrastructure most particularly -- was ofttimes based on relatively 
ancient information because the cost of collecting data was so high.  Now, with intelligent 
infrastructure in place collecting information for real-time operations, we have as a quite 
important side benefit the development of archival data that can greatly improve the quality of 
planning for strategic network change.  Like other notions in this paper, this is clear in 
retrospect.  At the time, our focus was so much on the “modern” applications of real-time data 
that we largely overlooked the more conventional advantages of large-scale transportation 
databases that came “for free” with the development of ITS infrastructure.   
 
Automated Network Management 
The gleam in the eye of the strategic planners in the early 90s was an automated system that 
collected data in real-time from transportation infrastructure and vehicles, and then, through 
intelligent algorithms, made automatic changes in network operations (i.e., without human 
intervention), so as to improve traffic flows and provide a better (i.e., faster) trip for travelers.  
The gathering of real-time data has happened, of course, but algorithms that change network 
operations have been slow to develop; to the author’s knowledge, it is virtually non-existent.  
Indeed, the author argues that the only ubiquitous automated transportation network management 
is through traffic light systems that are automatically modified in real-time without human 
intervention ( SCOOT, SCAT) .(7)  Other than that, the author believes that all the other network 
systems are decision-support systems for human decisionmakers who look at that data, 
presumably clearly presented for them, and then make a (human) decision about what to do to 
enhance network operations.  The next evolutionary step, when the computer makes that choice, 
essentially does not yet exist.   
Someday this will likely be the case.  But, if someone had told the planners in 1992 that 
in 2003 this would still be a will-o’-the-wisp, we would have been dismayed.   
 
Electronic Toll Collection (ETC) 
Another example of the slowness of development that would not have been predicted by the 
strategic planners in the early 1990s is electronic toll collection (ETC).  The reader may be 
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surprised to hear this; certainly many (including the author) would argue that electronic toll 
collection is the major success story of ITS, with implementations all over the country and 
abroad.  But there are still many states without any electronic toll collection, when the 
technology has long since been proven.  Who thought it would take so long?  Certainly not the 
strategic planners.   
What is also disquieting is the lack of compatible electronic toll collection systems, even 
in regions with many small states like New England, where it makes overwhelming sense.  The 
inability of organizations in the public sector to cooperate in the development of common 
technologies for the convenience of the traveling public continues to be a major barrier to 
compatible electronic toll collection systems.  It is relatively recently that the E-Z Pass system in 
the New York metropolitan area was implemented after a good deal of “negotiation” among the 
states of Connecticut, New York and New Jersey.  And it is even more recent that E-Z Pass has 
been made compatible with the FastLane system in Massachusetts.  E-Z Pass or FastLane only 
now is becoming available in New England states other than Massachusetts or Connecticut, 
where New England, with a number of small states, would really gain from compatible 
deployment of ETC.  
Most ambitiously, we would certainly hope that a nationally-scaled compatible ETC 
system would be in place.  Truckers, for whom long trips across political boundaries are 
common, would doubtless find this of great value.  One could imagine a single transponder in 
rental cars, where the tolls could simply be added to the bill rather than the driver fumbling for 
change.  But the current reading on getting a truly national system, which the strategic planners 
in the early 90s viewed as important (and even straightforward), is that it is a long way off due to 
that old bugaboo:  institutional issues.  
The strategic planners were not naïve about institutional issues; we realized they were 
going to be very difficult in the deployment of a new technology in a conservative industry.  But 
it is fair to say we grossly underestimated just how difficult it would be.  An anecdote:  In a talk 
at the ITS Massachusetts Annual Meeting in 2003, we heard about two variable message signs in 
rural central Massachusetts obtained “for free” through federal funding not being deployed for 
more than a year because of bureaucratic quibbling between two small public organizations 
about who would “really” own and operate them.   
 
Congestion Pricing 
Congestion pricing, or value pricing as it has also come to be called, was viewed as an important 
application of ITS technology at the time of the 1992 Strategic Plan.  It had the potential to 
smooth the peaks on congested highways by allowing individual drivers to make a choice about 
whether they were willing to pay a premium for traveling at a particular hour.  It was an idea that 
Professor William Vickrey first put forth in the 1950s; it was part of the body of work that won 
him the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1996.  Finally it had become technically feasible, based on 
ETC technology.   
Many of us, going back even to the early 90s, have been saying that “congestion pricing 
is inevitable”, but in fact it has taken a long, long time.  Earlier this year (2003), London 
instituted congestion charging in central London, with virtually all drivers paying about $8/day 
to cross the cordon.  Early reports are that this has had a substantial positive effect on 
congestion.  The notion is that if London can do it, perhaps many other cities can also (an 
argument that does not work for Singapore’s success, given their special political environment).  
So maybe the dam on congestion pricing will break now, but again the timeframe has been much 
longer than the planners thought.   
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In the U.S., the idea of high-occupancy toll (HOT) lanes, where single-occupancy 
vehicles can use the HOT lanes if they are willing to pay a toll, is an important application of 
value pricing.  The author expects to see more such applications in the future.  But, frankly, the 
author expected to see these in the mid-1990s!   
Another surprise is who is using the HOT lanes.  The conventional wisdom is that the 
wealthy would “unfairly” take advantage of this service.  In fact, working women (not 
necessarily wealthy) are disproportionate users as they (in our current culture) try to manage 
professional and personal responsibilities (so facing confiscatory penalties for being late to the 
day-care center, a HOT toll seems a small price to pay).(8)    
 
Architecture 
Developing a system architecture for ITS was recognized in the 1992 Strategic Plan, but the 
extraordinary effort this would become was not recognized, and certainly the ultimate use of the 
architecture would not have been predicted.   
The ITS architecture was developed in a “fly-off”, well-known to Department of Defense 
and weapons-system development, but virtually unknown to the U.S. Department of 
Transportation (U.S. DOT).  In 1994, four companies, Hughes, Loral, Rockwell and 
Westinghouse, each with various subcontractors, developed competitive architectures and 
ultimately the best was selected as the basis for the ITS architecture.(9)  U.S. DOT more 
normally would have selected the “best” contractor and used the architecture they developed.  
But this was a special situation.  ITS was the first civilian surface transportation system viewed 
as technologically complex enough to require an architecture.  Some were, and still are, skeptical 
that it does require that kind of top-down system design concept.  In any case, the architecture 
became a part of the ITS world.   
The notion of “regional architectures” that were required (by FHWA) to be “consistent” 
with the national architecture came later.  The author believes it is fair to say there is still not a 
complete understanding in the ITS community of what the term “consistent” means in this 
context.  This author wrote a column in 1999 trying to clarify what “consistency” meant.(10)  
Others joined the battle, but there is still at least some confusion.   
The Federal Highway Administration has used this consistency concept as a mechanism 
for controlling funds flowing from the federal government to the states.  It is fair to say that 
regional architectures have become a negotiating ground for various public-sector transportation 
organizations to develop ITS in their regions.  It is not clear that it has led to better integration of 
transportation operations, when they are run by a number of different public-sector agencies, as 
is usually the case.   
So, while in the 1992 Strategic Plan architecture was noted as a necessity for ITS because 
of its technical complexity, the energy and resources that went into the development of this 
architecture and its current use, now focused more on administrative control rather than technical 
advance and integration, is a surprise.   
Also, the routinization of the development of architectures through specialization 
software such as TurboArchitecture may have had a negative impact on how much deep thinking 
goes into the development of an integrated, high-technology surface transportation system.  
Moreover, the use of TurboArchitecture(11) and other shortcuts may delay the retooling of 
organizations and interorganizational relationships so necessary for effective deployment of an 
integrated ITS system.   
In the author’s view, the architecture grew from a straightforward concept to structure a 
technical system into a massive effort emphasizing administrative control.   
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On the other hand, some researchers, including the author, have redefined the regional 
architecture as an organizational concept, for specifying information flows and control 
hierarchies among participating organizations, with some good results.(12)   
So, the term “architecture” has come a long way from the concept in the 1992 Strategic 
Plan, in some ways positive but in some ways less so.   
 
Commercial Vehicle Operations (CVO) 
The view from the strategic planners was that commercial vehicle operations (CVO) could be an 
early winner in ITS.  Real-time routing of trucks, built on automatic vehicle location (AVL) 
technology for large truck fleets, was viewed as a mechanism for enhancing productivity.  Since 
trucks are a private-sector enterprise, these productivity enhancements could come directly down 
to the bottom line.  So if UPS, for example, could serve a metropolitan area with 40 rather than 
50 trucks providing the same level of service, due to productivity enhancements, that 10 fewer 
trucks manifests itself in more profit, or perhaps lower costs for shippers.  It is fair to say that 
these technologies have had a positive impact on commercial vehicles and their operation.  The 
planners did not foresee the negative reaction in the trucking industry, which was quite 
concerned about the federal government having information about their operations for privacy 
reasons, and also because it might leak to competitors -- and many firms basically said to the ITS 
community, “We’re already doing this; stay out of our hair.”  Many of these issues have been 
worked out by now, but it was difficult in the early years.   
The other aspect, largely unheralded by the planners, was the substantial positive benefit 
of the automation of mundane transactions between truck companies and state regulatory 
agencies (“one-stop shopping”).  Some thought this was not really ITS -- payment of excise 
taxes, relicensing, … -- and perhaps it is not, but the automation of these transactions has had a 
quite positive benefit through the CVISN system throughout the United States.(13)  Its 
importance was underestimated in the early 1990s.  
 
Advanced Public Transportation Systems (APTS) 
Some friction existed during the development of the Strategic Plan between the Federal Transit 
Administration (FTA) and the planners.  The FTA felt that initial drafts of the plan were focused 
almost entirely on highway applications and did not give proper weight to the applications of 
ITS to public transportation.  They were right.  After all, at that time the term of art was 
“Intelligent Vehicle Highway Systems (IVHS)”!  Eventually the Strategic Plan had a major 
section describing Advanced Public Transportation Systems (APTS) and APTS came to be 
thought of as a potential early winner of ITS.  It could improve fleet productivity (as with the 
trucks noted above) and lower costs for transit properties, as well as provide a higher quality of 
service for transit travelers through headway control and through real-time traveler information.   
Unfortunately, the rhetoric did not match the action in the field.  APTS have been much 
slower to develop than the FTA hoped.(14)  There are many reasons for this.  Transit agencies 
tend to be cash-poor and risk-averse.  Often they do not have the staffs necessary to evaluate and 
then utilize high-technology systems.  It is hoped that someday APTS will have a substantial 
effect nation-wide on public transportation, but currently the rhetoric outstrips the 
accomplishment.   
 
Regions 
Operating at a regional scale in surface transportation was an early dream of the strategic 
planners.(15)  Today it is even fair to say that there is a consensus -- in principle -- that ITS gives 
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us the capability of operating effectively at a regional scale, a scale much geographically larger 
than was feasible in a pre-ITS era.  The idea of the regional architecture described above is one 
manifestation of this consensus about regionalism and transportation.  Applications such as 
Transcom in the New York Metropolitan Area and TransInfo in the Bay Area are proof that it 
can be done.  But for the most part, regionalism has faltered under the difficulties in overcoming 
many of the institutional issues in cooperating on transportation needs 1) between the inner city 
and suburban communities; 2) between states in multi-state regions; and 3) between public 
safety and transportation operations organizations.   
There is no question that a strong theoretical case can be made for regionally-scaled 
operations in terms of effectiveness and efficiency but, as with many other ITS concepts, the 
slowness to develop on the ground is a disappointment.   
 
ITS Compared with the Interstate 
During the creation of the 1992 Strategic Plan, much rhetoric dealt with the equating of ITS with 
the Interstate System (e.g., ITS as a 21st century equivalent of the Interstate System).  In terms of 
impact, some felt ITS and the Interstate would one day be comparable.  It is, of course, early in 
the game, but thus far the Interstate has had much more profound impacts, both good and bad.  
The Interstate represented a fundamental change in mobility in the U.S. and helped create 
enormous economic growth.  Nonetheless, it has its critics who speak of adverse effects in cities 
(e.g., destruction of neighborhoods and urban fabric, sprawl), environmental impacts, and equity 
considerations.  What no one disagrees about is the magnitude of the effects of the Interstate on 
many dimensions.   
ITS is, of course, much younger; perhaps the major effect of strategic interest is the use 
of ITS technologies for supply chain management and freight logistics (and some would argue 
that movement pre-dated ITS anyway).  There has not been a major shift of infrastructure 
expenditure in highways from conventional infrastructure to the high-tech infrastructure that ITS 
represents, but this may yet come.  (Note that the current Bush administration has not bought 
into the early ITS rhetoric of “you can’t build your way out of congestion” with a big 
conventional infrastructure program.)  In-vehicle equipment (telematics) has had some effect on 
driving behavior, but not anywhere nearly as importantly as the Interstate did.  Electronic toll 
collection has been a big-impact item, but it could be argued that this is only a convenience at 
the margin rather than a basic change.  Congestion pricing, which would be a profound change, 
has yet to become prevalent, although the signs are beginning to be positive (London congestion 
charging scheme, as discussed earlier, for example).   
So, 11 years after the 1992 Strategic Plan, the strategic impacts of ITS still lie before us 
and, certainly, we have a long way to go before its impacts approach those of the Interstate.   
 
Security 
As noted earlier, back in the early 90s, 9/11 was an unpredictable nightmare, and the role of ITS 
in security was, if stated at all, a modest add-on to a technology focused on safety enhancements 
and congestion improvements.  But now in 2003, almost two years after 9/11, the use of ITS as a 
tool for enhancing national security is front-and-center on the agenda.  Certainly these concerns 
will make ITS a more saleable technological concept.  This is important as we approach the 
reauthorization of the “Transportation Efficiency Act for the 21st Century” (TEA-21).  The 
allocation of funds for ITS in the reauthorization legislation will have an important impact on 
future deployment.  And this leads, finally, to a more general comment on that reauthorization 
and the implications for ITS.   
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REAUTHORIZATION OF TEA-21 
How can we assure the continued effective deployment of ITS technologies?  TEA-21 
reauthorization is an instrument that is quite important for the future success of the transportation 
enterprise in the U.S.  And allocation of funds to ITS is an important factor for the future of that 
innovative segment of the transportation system.   
From almost the beginning of ITS, the conventional wisdom has been that ITS must 
demonstrate “real benefits” before it can be fully accepted.  Perhaps this is not completely true.  
The history of transportation investment says otherwise.  Here we are, essentially finished with 
the Interstate; yet there is still substantial debate about the benefits that accrue to society as a 
result of that extraordinary infrastructure deployment, and whether those benefits have 
outweighed costs that the sustainability community would point to.  Even the railroads, whose 
major years of building took place in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, have had their impact 
questioned and, to this day, the role of public finance of those major infrastructure projects is 
debated.   
It is unlikely we will every be able to build an ironclad case for ITS benefits.  Indeed, we 
may still not fully understand what the benefits are!  For example, as noted earlier, a recent 
finding has been that it is reliability and not average travel time that matters in what ITS 
provides, where for 12 years we have considered improved travel time as the sine qua non of ITS 
benefits.   
But we can build political, professional and public acceptance of ITS.  A better job of 
linking early successes like electronic toll collection to the more general uses of technology in 
surface transportation is a political approach.  Politicians need help from us in characterizing ITS 
as a project to their constituents back home in the same way conventional infrastructure is 
viewed.  The development of the “New Transportation Professional”(16), with more 
technologically-sophisticated people coming into the transportation industry, can lead to 
professional acceptance of ITS.  Taking advantage of the aging baby boomer demographics, that 
generation’s political power, and the desire of that generation to retain their mobility as long as 
possible is clearly a way toward public acceptance.  By allowing people to drive for longer as 
they age, ITS can build support.   
The strategic question for the ITS community is the extent to which bundling these 
political advantages and early winners into an integrated ITS program is the best political sell, as 
contrasted with selling each ITS component on its own.  Certainly the early strategic planners 
saw an integrated approach as an advantage.  We need now to take a hard look at whether it 
continues to be so.   
 
A FINAL WORD 
So, looking back on the 1992 Strategic Plan, while it served as a base for what came later, there 
were obvious things overlooked; there are things that really happened, although over a much 
longer time period than had been hoped; some factors were underestimated, such as institutional 
issues (despite believing we were conservative); there were concepts such as the architecture that 
greatly expanded from the initial notion of the need for a technical architecture into a concept 
with a life of its own with more administrative than technical content.   
But good progress has been made in ITS.  The field has matured.  The profession is 
changing.  And in all ITS is an integral part of our surface transportation systems, building on 
our current successes for years to come.  But, patience, as always, will continue to be required as 
we wait for the full impacts of ITS to be felt.   
Joseph Sussman 
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